Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the architect of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, predicted the pivotal role that industrial overmatch would play in the outcome of World War II. Proving him right, America produced a staggering 300,000 aircraft during the war compared to Japan’s meager 76,000.
Experts suggest that having AI systems try to outwit one another could help a person judge their intentions.
Boyd sought not so much to circumvent Clausewitz as to use the Prussian’s concepts as fuel in his own mental refinery. And Boyd’s message to his audience was that the process of mental refinement could not stop, nor be confined to the ideas of any one individual, no matter how insightful they might
Editor’s Note: This is the fourth installment in “Off Guard,” a series on surprise in war inspired by a new CSIS study. Read the rest of the series here. Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush saw different worlds in early 2003, but shared a common belief: Each was certain that his read of the strategic situation was
Although war is a uniquely military activity because of the threat or use of violence, organizations that go to war share many characteristics with civilian organizations.
Source: Two Worlds of Strategy
“IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE INFORMATION, the word came later. The transition was achieved by the development of organisms with the capacity for selectively exploiting this information in order to survive and perpetuate their kind.”
“Combating information warfare is complicated. The first step requires letting people who were the targets of the disinformation campaign know they were manipulated. “
She is right about the non-technical aspects but had to throw in the ultra geek buffer overflow comment 🙂
We need a new definition of cybersecurity that includes not only virtual and physical infrastructure attacks, but psychological warfare.
The document is from the Cold War. But the material it teaches is still being used today by Vladimir Putin’s clandestine cadres.