In this second post in our series about Canada’s national security law reform, we begin a discussion of changes proposed for the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canada’s primary signals intelligence and cybersecurity agency. We focus specifically on how Canada will address an issue that has also arisen in allied states: oversight of bulk collection that may incidentally include communications involving nationals.
It is about disrupting and holding accountable entrenched actors and conduct that have reared their ugly heads again and again over the years continuing to present.
The following have been updated and added to the integrated slides:
Never Too Late
Focusing on Relevant Stuff
Title 26, 18, 50 and 10 Confusion
Federal Investigations Primer:
Added compartmentalization & Need to Know
Cross-Border Law Enforcement Primer:
Added Canadian “Agent” Role
Added Stings, Ethnic Communities and Foreign Personas
Updated Factual Instances: Corruption
Updated Impacts of Off-the-Books or Regional Independence Alliances
Sources, Operatives & Organizations Digest:
Added Criminal Organization Structure
Added Criminal Organization Communication Structure
Added Matchmakers & Rainmakers
Seattle Federal Corruption Slides Integrated:
Added Selected Linkages Slide Set
This post is the 2nd addendum to (previous limited information 9 posts) and integrated post for documentation and reference purposes. Information, context and statements were previously and contemporaneously documented and independently verifiable. Conclusions and assessments are self-evident or clearly marked and separately identified. Related efforts are not recent and have been ongoing for a significant period.
VICE News obtained the manual for the DEA’s “Sensitive Investigative Unit,” which trains elite foreign cops to target drug kingpins.
A few years ago, shortly after stepping down as Assistant Attorney General for National Security, I published a long article called Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool. As its title suggests, the article’s central thesis was that law enforcement methods are useful in combating international terrorism. I did not try to make the case that law enforcement is the only, or even necessarily the best, way of combating terrorism.
The EU data law is scheduled to take effect May 25.
Very nice thought through paper. The challenge is in the details and implementation. Practically impossible to arrive at common baseline standards, implement and monitor/ensure compliance and change.
A new paper from New America introduces a novel framework for data flow controls.
Deciphering is one thing and there is more there … then you don’t know what you don’t know.
The Schiff memo, the Democrats’ response to the Nunes memo’s claims about the Russia investigation, was released over the weekend and it contained a few nuggets of new information.
The European Union is preparing legislation to force companies to turn over customers’ personal data when requested even if it is stored on servers outside the bloc, a position that will put Europe at loggerheads with tech giants and privacy campaigners.
Certainly good points, politics and maneuvering aside, but since majority of people do not know the underlying “highly sensitive” intelligence the root cause of the beef can still not be deciphered by the majority of the majority of those people in the dark. Psst … if the Russians know a good part of the “highly sensitive” S&M intelligence how much of the classification is institutional PR protection? And what is it with the email format and hand writing corrections? Nunes memo was a Monarch note and this is more like Shakespeare. I still need to digest this document and read every footnote.
Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee have released their rebuttal to the memo on alleged surveillance abuses prepared by Chairman Devin Nunes. The rebuttal memo is available in full below.