A new guide from the U.S. Army tells soldiers thinking about information warfare missions to consider a simple task: build a street map.
Tactical, operational, and strategic success requires a cultural change to reconcile institutional aversion and reluctance toward non-lethal information warfare. To dominate the information domain before, during, and after the next conflict, significant change is required in the U.S. military’s approach toward training and education of information as a warfighting function, and information operations as a discipline.
A new project addresses how artificial intelligence might change how states decide to use force against one another.
An adversary who has access to the dataset your AI trained on can figure out what its likely blind spots are, said Brian Sadler, a senior scientist at the Army Research Laboratory: “If I know your data, I can create ways to fake out your system.”
No! Who would want to perpetuate the problem?!
“Despite the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure being validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, it still faces opposition from Congress and some in industry who seek to perpetuate the problem, and their government contracts, by obfuscating any simple solution to the state of being data rich and information poor.”
And the final recommendation is just an authoritative EDW. See that go on a tailspin before.
Finland’s GPS signal was intentionally disrupted during NATO war games in the Nordic countries over the past few weeks and the culprit could be Russia, Prime Minster Juha Sipila said on Sunday.
In an expansive on-the-record interview with WIRED, the principal deputy director of national intelligence made her pitch for public-private partnerships.
And the burn: “One of the key things about Google is I think it’s adorable that they have morals now when they’re using technology that the department built for them. That’s cute,” she says, “But we’ve always done this together.”
A helipad and 9 piers? Maybe. But who needs a floating sauna? May also be a GRU spring break or party island.
Finnish authorities said it was all about money laundering, but the island’s strategic location, multiple docks, helipad, and more suggest otherwise.
Back in the mid-1990s senior leaders in the U.S. Air Force were deeply enmeshed in a debate—one that, as General (Ret.) Michael Hayden describes it, was almost Jesuitical in its seeming abstruseness. The Air Force, on the cutting edge of new computer-enabled capabilities, was trying to decide whether this new domain of activity was one of “cyber” operations or one of “information” operations.
Source: The Death of Cyber Utopia