The House Intelligence Committee’s failure to have a full public debate on the real threats posed by Section 702 was a disservice to those whom members of Congress serve: the American people.
Our latest data on which institutions the public trusts and mistrusts to protect the country’s security.
Bureaucracies and their management (government being the top offender) often act in not very efficient and political manner, and not with the best (hindsight) judgement. Technology and IT system selection and integration are among the worst examples. Notwithstanding the possibility that some essential required capabilities were redacted (illegal could also mean inability to conform with a required legal demand which is also redacted) there is no linkage to 9/11 having been prevented. Ironically, the article is a trailblazer of assumptions and thin on evidence threads and conclusions! It is not like there was no warning at all. At least he got it right on metadata and taxonomies.
Retired Gen. Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA and CIA (and now, a national security analyst at CNN), has recently emerged as a leading critic of the Trump administration, but not so long ago, he was widely criticized for his role in the post-9/11 surveillance abuses.
Critics have long argued that the government has wide latitude to conduct surveillance under broad approvals from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Congress should require the FBI to obtain a court order when it wants to access the content of communications of known Americans.
The House intelligence committee’s proposal to reauthorize Section 702 wisely requires congressional leadership notification for the disemmination of ‘unmasked’ identitifes of members of presidential transition teams.
Proponents of Section 702 are relying on misleading statements and omissions to make their case.