The Trump administration has accused Russia of a coordinated “multi-stage intrusion campaign” to hack into critical U.S. infrastructure networks and conduct “network reconnaissance” while attempting to delete evidence of their intrusions.
In this second post in our series about Canada’s national security law reform, we begin a discussion of changes proposed for the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canada’s primary signals intelligence and cybersecurity agency. We focus specifically on how Canada will address an issue that has also arisen in allied states: oversight of bulk collection that may incidentally include communications involving nationals.
Petrochemical companies were hit by a series of cyberassaults last year. The worst of them, against a widely used safety system, could have set off an explosion.
It is about disrupting and holding accountable entrenched actors and conduct that have reared their ugly heads again and again over the years continuing to present.
The following have been updated and added to the integrated slides:
Never Too Late
Focusing on Relevant Stuff
Title 26, 18, 50 and 10 Confusion
Federal Investigations Primer:
Added compartmentalization & Need to Know
Cross-Border Law Enforcement Primer:
Added Canadian “Agent” Role
Added Stings, Ethnic Communities and Foreign Personas
Updated Factual Instances: Corruption
Updated Impacts of Off-the-Books or Regional Independence Alliances
Sources, Operatives & Organizations Digest:
Added Criminal Organization Structure
Added Criminal Organization Communication Structure
Added Matchmakers & Rainmakers
Seattle Federal Corruption Slides Integrated:
Added Selected Linkages Slide Set
This post is the 2nd addendum to (previous limited information 9 posts) and integrated post for documentation and reference purposes. Information, context and statements were previously and contemporaneously documented and independently verifiable. Conclusions and assessments are self-evident or clearly marked and separately identified. Related efforts are not recent and have been ongoing for a significant period.
VICE News obtained the manual for the DEA’s “Sensitive Investigative Unit,” which trains elite foreign cops to target drug kingpins.
How much of this is due to overclassification? Simplified:
Risk imposed by backlogs + Risks imposed by unnecessary classification and by default > Cost of fixing the classification system (instead of physical queue management)
A nearly four-fold increase has people waiting more than a year for top-secret clearance.
Wise words on risks of accuracy in profiling, customized crafting of messages, impersonation and loss of confidence in authentication of individual. I am not sure how otherwise relevant scale and speed of AI can be. Limitations on information input, absorption and processing capability of human beings are blessings that cap the output power any information presentation system. The danger is not in death by a thousand cuts of utterly confused and zombie citizens, but one mission bullets which then are not effective for mass deception, and easier to defend against their best logical targets of critical decision makers.
Today, waging information warfare is a manpower-intensive effort. What if that changes?
Presidents and generals depend upon timely intelligence to shape their decisions in a world of ambiguity, hostile actors and disinformation. The savviest leaders in the private sector do the same. Governments have broad intelligence authorities and powerful tools unavailable to the private sector, but they do not have a monopoly on the application of intelligence.
Litvinenko defected, this guy was exchanged. Not that FSB can’t. Seems pretty bold, unnecessary and out of line for exchanges. A false flag, attempt to chill exchanges or a prelude to a planned tit-for-tat misdirection?
The man, living in the UK, was one of two exposed to a “substance” in Salisbury, the BBC is told.
Determining the origins of cyberattacks is already difficult, but cyber actors can further muddy attribution through false flag attacks.